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Abstract
While it is commonly assumed that there are no known precedents against which to 
benchmark the internationalisation of the Renminbi (RMB), this paper argues that the PRCs 
own development provides a useful perspective on the internationalisation debate. 
Specifically it indicates that lessons can be learnt from the successes and the shortcomings of 
efforts to internationalise the RMB in the 1970s. During this period Chinese state-owned 
banks in Hong Kong played a central role in mobilising finance for foreign trade. Access to 
Hong Kong’s developed financial institutions allowed the PRC to maximise its receipts from 
foreign trade, promote the RMB as a stable currency that was likely to appreciate as well as 
minimise the risks of undue swings in capital flows. The paper shows that although China no 
longer faces foreign exchange scarcity, economic reforms have not yet resolved 
vulnerabilities in China’s financial institutions. Unlike the 1970s China is no longer immune 
from market risk that might accompany a reduction in foreign residents RMB holdings. As 
such Hong Kong’s banking system has retained its unique role as the location of choice for 
mitigating the risk of undue capital swings.
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Taking the perspective that theory can only advance the understanding of pressing new 
macroeconomic developments so far, and that history is the only true laboratory for the study 
of pressing macroeconomic developments (e.g. Taylor, 2012); this paper argues that RMB 
internationalisation is best understood in the context of the long-term importance attached by 
the PRC to hard currency earnings as part of its objective of economic modernisation. This 
attachment has seen the China’s economy shift from a shortage of foreign currency pre-1979 
to a post-1979 surplus, but it has not necessarily resolved vulnerabilities in China’s financial 
institutions. A comparison between the two periods shows that although China is no longer 
short of foreign exchange, the political reluctance to allow capital mobility remains.
Moreover although the ideological opposition to openness has softened, what distinguishes 
the current policy conundrum is the scale and risk of capital outflow that greater capital 
mobility now implies.  The paper also shows how in both periods the banking sector has been 
a key participant. In the 1970s the PRC’s Hong Kong-based financial institutions played a 
central role in solving severe foreign exchange shortages. Since 2004 Chinese state-owned 
financial institutions in Hong Kong have again been to the fore in offering non-deliverable 
RMB deposits, but it has ultimately been the pressing demand for further banking reform that 
has underpinned the need for further liberalisation.
China’s economic reforms have given an unprecedented access to foreign capital for a 
developing economy. By 2012 China had some 436,800 foreign invested enterprises with a 
registered paid up capital of US$1.79 trillion.i Foreign exchange earnings from international 
trade have resulted in the accumulation of some US$3.2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves. 
These two features contrast sharply with the PRCs position in the mid-1970s when there were 
widespread rumours regarding the perilous state of China’s foreign exchange reserves and the 
potential inability of the PRC to pay for imports.ii A report by the State Planning Commission 
in 1974 indicated that China’s foreign exchange deficit for the first three quarters of 1974 
would reach US$1.2-1.4 billion and led to suggestions by Li Xiannian that China should 
consider the increased use of trade loans.iii  At the time, official attitudes to foreign currency 
loans were influenced by the view that foreign capital and loans were exploitative. In 
response to the shortage of foreign exchange PRC officials and in particular its state-owned 
banks - mostly those based in Hong Kong - made important efforts to accustom international 
investors to holding non-convertible RMB. They did so in an international economic 
environment that was not only volatile, having just emerged from the collapse of Breton 
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Woods, but also one that was often hostile towards PRC interests. The efforts to accustom 
foreign investors to holding RMB bear a remarkable similarly to the contemporary RMB 
deposits in Hong Kong.
There is an additional notable feature that differentiated efforts in the two periods. In the 
1970s, the PRC was able to promote the RMB as a currency that was likely to appreciate 
significantly, without exposing the PRC to external currency risk.iv Officials could argue that 
the RMB enjoyed a stable purchasing power; it benefited from a centralised and unified 
system of currency issuance; and was free from the volatility associated with the currencies 
of capitalist countries.v Ideologically, such use of foreign capital could be justified on the 
grounds that it allowed China to exploit international finance for the benefit of socialist 
modernisation. In that way, PRC officials could easily differentiate themselves from what 
they viewed as the Soviet revisionists’ apparent willingness to accept foreign trade credits.vi
The PRC’s rejection of ideology in 1978 and its replacement with market pragmatism meant 
that this differentiation was no longer credible. The subsequent running of large trade 
surpluses and accumulation of large US$ reserves meant that the PRC was no longer immune 
from the risk of currency volatility and capital outflow. While China can still promote the 
RMB as an undervalued currency, it can no longer claim immunity from market risk that 
might accompany a reduction in foreign residents RMB holdings.vii From a historical 
perspective it illustrated how much the role of international capital had changed and the scale 
of the new risks the PRC would face. 
Despite the stark contrasts between both periods, the paper indicates that lessons can be learnt 
from the shortcomings of efforts to internationalise the RMB in the 1970s. In particular it 
provides an interesting perspective on the question of why China still faces the dilemma of 
balancing currency convertibility with economic control. In addressing this question the 
paper examines the connection between currency internationalisation, financial reform, and 
globalisation in developing economies. Section 2 explores the tension between maximising 
foreign exchange earnings and minimising risk in developing economies; its relationship to 
the banking system; the conundrum facing developing economies in opening their capital 
accounts; and the special institutional arrangements that are often required to do so. It also 
looks at the extent to which the offshore deposit market in Hong Kong has offered China a 
secure way of gradually internationalising the RMB. Section 3 looks at how the PRC 
resolved severe shortages of foreign exchange the 1960s and 1970s and how this led to 
efforts to achieve a greater internationalisation of the RMB. Section 4 explores the lessons 
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from this period, in particular where it succeeded and what were its shortcomings. The paper 
concludes by arguing that the dilemma China now faces is much the same as in the 1970s in 
the sense that the question over how to achieve convertibility remains unresolved; but the 
risks of capital outflow are now significantly greater.
2. Theoretical Background 
There exist many reasons why developing countries seek greater currency 
internationalisation. These range from the fundamental concern of financing foreign trade to 
concerns over the value of reserve currencies and foreign exchange exposures.  For many 
developing economies, particularly those with weak financial institutions or facing economic 
sanctions and trade embargos, access to a predictable and stable flow of hard currency 
earnings is a pressing issue. Despite the phenomenal growth in cross-border financial flows 
over the past few decades, many developing economies remain short of the capital necessary 
to finance development (Prasad et al, 2003). The PRC’s own development experience 
indicates that the reasons why countries seek greater currency internationalisation may vary 
over time and according to the level of institutional development.  It also shows how 
important are financial institutions in mobilising finance and trade settlement. The following 
section indicates that this is crucial in understanding Hong Kong’s role as a source of foreign 
exchange earnings and as a location that offers the type of secure institutions capable of 
supporting an off-shore RMB market. 
2.1 Mobilising Cross Border Finance
While economists have long known that institutions matter, it has been argued that in order to 
determine how and why, a source of exogenous variation in institutional quality is needed 
(Acemoglu et al, 2001). As delineators of wealth and poverty as well as the extent to which 
societies have attained their potentials, borders offer a powerful example of such variation 
(Baumol, 1990; Olson, 1996). For developing economies national borders also represent one 
of the most forceful examples of variation in the ability to mobilise finance. The PRC’s 
border with Hong Kong was no different. Access to Hong Kong’s free market helped 
mitigate the structural constraint that affected many developing economies of how to acquire 
foreign exchange earnings to maintain inputs and service debt and trade credit obligations 
(Diamond, 1974). The reasons for this are intuitive. External trade cannot be conducted 
without international exchange (Clauson, 1944). Exchange cannot occur without the financial 
institutions that issue and redeem currency as goods and services are traded. The exchange of 
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currency often required elaborate and unusual institutional arrangements that extend beyond 
national borders. These have ranged from the Currency Authority that underpinned the 
British Colonial system to more recent schemes used by large banks to evade trade 
embargos.viii
Such unusual arrangements are themselves a product of weak domestic financial intuitions. 
Gershenkron (1962) highlights the case of 19th century Russia as an example of the 
impossibility of building up a system of long term bank credit in a system where mercantile 
activities and deceit were inextricably connected. Bloomfield (1957) writing on the problems 
facing central banking in under-developed countries, argues that the growth in central 
banking in these countries was a reflection of their desire to pursue monetary policies that 
maximised economic development and mitigated undue swings in national incomes. The 
ability of these central banks to use open market operations to balance these two objectives 
was restricted by the limited scope of money markets in developing countries. In order to deal 
with such substantial and unpredictable fluctuations as large deposit withdrawals and bank 
runs, banks tended to maintain large reserves. The consequence of this liquidly concern was a 
short term focus on trade finance in their commercial operations and a preference for high 
reserve ratios.
For Gerschenkron (1962) remedying this problem required special institutional factors. He 
argued that the more backward a country was, the more likely it would need special 
institutional factors to increase the supply of capital to industry. This could come in the form 
of the role of banks in the industrialisation of Central Europe or indeed the Ministry of 
Finance in Russia’s industrialisation of the 1890s (Gerschenkron, 1962: 356). For pre-reform 
China, the special institutional factors that allowed the PRC to access hard currency were 
Hong Kong’s banking system (Goodstadt, 2006, Tobin, 2011). As part of the sterling area, 
Hong Kong was beyond the reach of the US embargo on the PRC and as such offered the 
only point of safe access to the outside world. Hong Kong’s free market meant that it was a 
secure place to do business for China. This was facilitated by a special set of circumstances 
that allowed Hong Kong’s colonial government to effectively turn a blind eye, or in some 
cases implicitly assist the development of a flourishing money market in Hong Kong. The 
predictability and efficiency of theses currency inflows that this delivered was crucial for 
China’s survival (Goodstadt, 2007: 91). That they were also technically illegal from the 
perspective of the US (and the UK prior to 1967) and inconsistent with the PRC’s ideological 
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stance on money markets did not matter. For the PRC the fact that such money markets were 
illegal would merely have represented another contradiction in the capitalist system of 
finance.
Participation in these markets also introduced market-based risks into the system of central 
planning. Foreign exchange introduced normal market risk since trades took place outside the 
central plan. This risk can be conceptualised in terms of the dynamic commitment (Berglof 
and Roland, 1998) and time inconsistency problems (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). These 
refer to the discretion of policy makers to re-optimise their policy choices when they deem 
necessary, and the de-facto discretion of banks to respond opportunistically. China’s banks 
were probably well aware of the moral compromises and the illegality of the sterling trade, 
but just like Hong Kong’s officials, they were also aware that if the rules were strictly applied 
the banking system would not work. Consequently a lax approach was followed in banking 
regulation that was both based on economic rationality and facilitating Mainland interests.ix
Although economic reforms have since eroded many of the systematic differences between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong, it is significant that cross border interactions based on 
special and somewhat unusual institutional arrangements continue to characterise the 
internationalisation of the RMB. The quest for a safe place to do business remains a feature 
of China’s development. Hong Kong has offered China’s indigenous entrepreneurs access to 
the efficient institutions of formal financing outside of Mainland China (Huang, 2008). China 
continues to view Hong Kong’s role as central, not just for the window it provides for 
economic and trade exchanges between the Mainland and other countries, but also allows 
effective management of the risks associated with the cross-border trade (PBC, 2011:14).
2.2 Sequencing, Openness and Development 
While the pre-reform economy relied very much what could be termed special institutional 
arrangements, the switch from foreign exchange shortage to surplus post-1979 has also 
shifted the debate towards how China can better manage inflows. Research now appears to 
indicate that were China to significantly increase its capital account convertibility, the RMB 
could become an important currency in international trade. Research by Chen (2007) 
indicates that given China’s economic size, the RMBs position as an international reserve 
currency would be comparable to either the Japanese Yen or British Pound, possibly 
accounting for 3% to 5% of global reserves. Cui et al (2009) estimate that as much as 20%-
30% of China’s annual trade could be settled in RMB. The advantages of such a move are 
Centre for Financial & Management Studies | SOAS | University of London
7?
?
wide and varied, and range from the ability to diversity currency risk to making aid payments 
in its own currency. But there are also drawbacks. Full convertibility implies deliverability. 
This in turn implies that capital can flow more freely inwards, but it can also flow outwards. 
This introduces risks, the management of which depend on a fully functioning set of financial 
institutions.
One of the drawbacks of full capital account liberalisation that Chinese policy makers can 
readily cite is the very limited evidence on the relationship between financial openness and 
economic development. Although neo-classical economics has argued that long-term 
financial flows from capital rich to capital poor countries should generate welfare gains for 
both sets of countries, these benefits have ultimately proved difficult to quantify. A revised 
approach has instead argued that countries first need to reach a threshold of institutional 
development before they can hope to benefit from financial globalisation (Kose et al, 2006; 
Prasad et al, 2003).  An IMF staff paper, which reviewed the evidence on capital controls and 
surges in capital inflows, indicated that capital controls are a legitimate part of the policy 
toolkit for managing inflows in such circumstances where the usual policy remedies are not 
appropriate (Ostry et al, 2010).x This includes scenarios where it is not possible to quickly 
address domestic financial fragility through the domestic prudential framework
The above concerns have been echoed by Chinese officials and economists. While the issue 
of exploitation by foreign capital largely ceased to feature in the literature after the 1980s, it 
was replaced by the question of how foreign capital could best be managed for China’s 
benefit (Hsu, 1991, 134-136). There also appears to have an implicit acceptance that China 
has not yet reached the institutional thresholds that would enable it to fully benefit from 
capital account liberalisation. The Peoples Bank of China have highlighted the importance of 
reforming the RMB in a “self-initiated, controllable, and gradual manner” in the absence of 
full institutional development.xi  Reflecting the views set out by the IMF, it has also been 
argued that controls on currency transactions ultimately helped to protect the economy from 
the instability caused by the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis and sheltered the economy 
from the worst effects of the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis. Huang and Tao (2011) point 
out that many PRC officials remain concerned about the negative effects of currency 
appreciation, using the Japanese experience of economic stagnation following the Plaza 
Accord as a rationale.
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Alongside these concerns there has also been an acknowledgement of the inevitability of 
opening the capital account. Huang et al (2011) have argued that although close control over 
cross border flows initially benefited China, the costs of maintaining these controls have 
gradually increased. These include costs related to maintaining capital controls in an 
increasingly open economy and the associated loss of monetary independence. Ultimately 
they believe that capital account controls now represent a significant obstacle to China 
meeting its policy objectives of RMB internationalisation and turning Shanghai into a 
financial centre by 2015. This is consistent with the empirical evidence put forward by Chinn 
and Ito (2006), which indicates that trade openness is a prerequisite for capital account 
liberalisation and development of the banking sector is a precondition for equity market 
development. If these findings are applicable to China it is unsurprising that RMB 
internationalisation and banking reform are mow viewed as urgent priorities. 
One of the puzzles of China’s reforms is that despite significant trade openness, capital 
account transactions remain tightly controlled and its banking sector remains largely off-
limits to foreign investors. By 2010 foreign banking assets accounted for a mere 1.85 per cent 
of total banking assets. The weaknesses of China’s banking system are well known. After 
more than four decades of reform initiatives, the banking system remains dysfunctional 
having borne much of the costs of reforms (Goodstadt, 2012). Banking reforms have 
essentially been “needs driven”.  As result the sector now faces a large reform deficit; the 
implication being that conventional prudential and monetary mechanisms cannot be relied 
upon to implement policy (Tobin, 2012). The extent of the reform deficit is such that it is 
believed that the link between bank financing and growth no longer holds and a large 
proportion of bank lending is now off-balance sheet (PBC, 2011). These deficiencies are 
important as they impede Shanghai’s stated objective of becoming a global RMB trading 
centre, let alone its ambition to be an international financial centre. It has been argued that by 
ceding more voice to foreign interests, overseas investment in China’s banking sector has the 
potential to markedly improve the performance of the banking system (Hope and Hu, 2006). 
However it is almost impossible to increase the participation of foreign banks or create a 
flourishing financial centre in the absence of capital account liberalisation.
2.3 The Offshore Market in Hong Kong
Given the weaknesses in the domestic banking sector, the RMB business in Hong Kong 
provides a useful testing ground for the expanded regional use of the RMB (Chen, 2007). 
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Table 2 shows the rapid RMB deposits in Hong Kong since 2004 and as a means of trade 
settlement since late 2009. Many have have viewed this as a relatively benign growth, and a 
reflection of capital controls by Mainland authorises for which Hong Kong banks are well 
equipped to deal with given their diversified holdings of other asset forms. xii The data show 
that China has increased the number of institutions permitted to offer RMB deposits in Hong 
Kong and used interest rate to manage the market as it has developed. McCauley (2011) 
argues that China departed from the conventional practice of ignoring the build-up of an off-
shore currency market. In this way Chinese policy makers have paid attention to its signals, 
implicitly recognising its inevitability and attempted to shape its development.
The development of an offshore market for RMB in Hong Kong and its possible extension to 
other financial centres such as London has provided an interesting new policy avenue for 
RMB internationalisation.xiii  It offers monetary authorities both quantitative and market-
based tools (McCauley, 2011). China can control the quantity by adjusting the quotas for 
clearing banks and they can affect the yield by varying the interest rate that the Peoples Bank 
of China pays clearing banks for deposits. In ensuring that it can adequately control the off-
shore market, China has used its own state banks in Hong Kong. In December 2003 the 
Peoples Bank of China authorised the state-owned Bank of China (Hong Kong) as the 
clearing banks for personal RMB business under the Clearing Agreement on RMB Business. 
As the following section will show, the Hong Kong branch of the Bank of China has had a 
long role in coordinating the PRC’s external foreign exchange policy. China has also 
sanctioned a non-deliverable virtual currency forwards market. While it not clear the extent to 
which authorities can control this market, efforts at control may include e influence over 
state-owned banks and large state corporations which trade as counterparties to foreign 
investors (MaCauley, 2011).
But the process of RMB internationalisation is not without risk.  Although RMB deposits in 
Hong Kong are non-deliverable, there are specific risks for both Hong Kong’s banking sector 
and the ability of Chinese policy makers to exercise the same level of control over the off-
shore market, particularly in the event that it becomes deliverable. Potential risks are best 
illustrated in periods of volatility. For example, RMB deposits reached RMB 77,640 billion 
in the second quarter of 2008, but subsequently declined to RMB 53,110 billion in quarter 1, 
2009, before finishing 2009 at RMB 62,718 billion. This volatility was attributed to 
speculation about changes in the RMB exchange rate and the launch of RMB denominated 
bonds. During this period the ratio of demand to time deposits was generally 2:1. Although a 
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degree of maturity mismatching is inevitable, a large proposition of demand deposits can give 
rise to a liquidity (or refunding) and interest rate risk, unless the risk can be offset to 
borrowed using variable loan interest rates (Mullineux, 2011). In 2010, there was a sudden 
increase in the share of RMB deposits as a percentage of total Hong Kong deposit from 2.4% 
to 11.5%. This was attributed to an increase in corporate RMB receipts in trade settlements 
and also expectation of appreciation in the value of the RMB. During this period the number 
of institutions offering RMB deposits expanded rapidly and the interest differential between 
time and demand interest rates appeared to widen (Figure 1). The period also witnessed a 
reversal in the ratio of demand to time deposits to a more stable ratio of 1:3. 
In August 2012, RMB deposits in Hong Kong were reported to have fallen by 1.9% as trade 
remittances to Mainland China increased.xiv While such declines are can be viewed as a 
normal part of Hong Kong growing role in RMB trade remittances (Table 1), RMB deposits 
now represent a substantial part of Hong Kong banks funding base. By Quarter 2 2012, RMB 
deposits accounted for some 17.5% of deposits in Hong Kong having grown from just 1.1% 
in 2004.  Since the growth of RMB deposits ultimately affects the ability of Hong Kong 
banks to finance increases in their loan books and further extend RMB investment products, 
it would appear there are risks attached to having a deposit base denominated in a non-
deliverable currency whose quantity is subject to swings in trade remittances and exchange 
rate speculation. With few appropriate comparisons it is possible to view these developments 
as having a relatively benign impact on Hong Kong’s developed financial sector. 
Alternatively they could be viewed as an early warning of the likely difficulties that China 
will face should its capital account become convertible.
(Table 1 and Figure 1 here) 
3. The Historical Precedent 
Recent efforts to have the RMB accepted as an international currency of exchange have an 
interesting precedent from the pre-1979 economy. Efforts in the 1970s to accustom 
international investors to holding RMB were influenced by a number of factors in the 
domestic and international economy.  Following the Korean War (1950-53) the US froze 
many of the PRC’s external assets and as a result the PRC held a large proportion of foreign 
reserves in sterling (Donnithorne, 1967). For Hong Kong, there was a widespread perception 
that PRC involvement in the Korean War effectively cast into doubt Hong Kong’s future as 
an entrepôt economy following the sealing of its border with the PRC (Catron, 1972, Sung, 
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2005). From 1960 onwards the Sino-Soviet dispute witnessed a rapid reduction in trade with 
the USSR. The consequence of these events and the ideological reluctance to accept 
international loans and trade credits was an increasing reliance on hard currency earnings. 
Similarly, economic crisis in Western economies in the 1970s and the desperate need to 
modernise industry meant that having the RMB accepted an international currency of 
settlement carried enormous appeal. The following describes how the international operations 
of China’s state-owned banks in Hong Kong had already begun to actively promote the RMB 
as one of the few stable currencies by offering RMB deposits. It also describes how Chinese 
officials were astute observers of the problems facing international financial markets. They 
were also able to resolve key ideological obstacles to trade and investment financing. This is 
illustrated in their ability to resolve such conundrums as how to find a formula to allow Sino-
Japanese trade to be conducted in RMB and Yen.
3.1 Banks, Export Competitiveness and Finance 
Under the PRC’s pre-reform economy there was a strong relationship between state-owned 
banks and export competitiveness. The banking system, particularly its Hong Kong branch, 
played a central role in maximising foreign exchange receipts from trade, protecting China’s 
foreign exchange assets by maintaining a watchful eye on the international monetary 
environment, and maintaining good links with the international banking community. It 
carried out there functions primarily for the benefit of China’s state-owned trading 
corporations. Despite their communist allegiances, PRC Officials were well informed on the 
problems facing western banks during the 1970s and how this affected the performance of 
these economies. Official media routinely outlined how this was a consequence of unstable 
money markets in these countries and the dangers that banking collapses posed to the 
economy.xv It is unsurprising therefore that the PRC placed great emphasis on financial 
system stability and on the moral standing of the individuals charged to run these institutions. 
What is surprising is how well these officials were able to predict market developments and 
use them to the PRC’s advantage.
At the centre of China’s international banking system was the Hong Kong branch of the Bank 
of China, the bank that was in 2003 designated as the clearing banks for RMB deposits in 
Hong Kong. The Bank of China was the specialised foreign exchange bank of the PRC, 
performing the entire task of settling the PRC’s international payments.xvi  Its main function 
was financing China’s external trade. Its main business was trade financing and it by and 
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large avoided any involvement in commercial lending. As such an important distinction 
between the bank balances of Hong Kong’s commercial banks and PRC banks was that the 
balances of the latter mostly represented a surplus of trade conducted through state-owned 
trading companies in Hong Kong. This surplus was deposited with the bank’s head office in 
Peking in the name of the Hong Kong Branch. Part, but not all, of these funds were used to 
purchase sterling, mainly through the Hong Kong and London branches of the Bank of China, 
to pay for imports. The significance of these locations was that as part of the sterling area 
they were beyond the reach of the US legal institutions. State-ownership of trading 
companies implied that all balances can be thought of as effectively due to Peking. As such 
bank balances represented a trade credit facility for the PRC.
Although the PRC’s trade credit facility operated beyond the reach of US legal institutions, 
the process was effectively illegal under the UK’s Defence (Finance) Regulations. The 
Defence (Finance) Regulations imposed exchange controls on Hong Kong and first came into 
force when the Colony joined the sterling area in 1941.xvii Colonies were required to exert 
careful control and share information on sterling supply within the sterling area and non-
sterling exports.xviii  The operations of PRC banks therefore created a mismatch between the 
controls imposed in the rest of the sterling area and what was happening in Hong Kong. For 
Hong Kong such requirements were also cumbersome as many of its raw materials were 
sourced outside the sterling area. For example trade with Mainland China relations pre-dated 
the establishment of the PRC in 1949. While Hong Kong could in geneal avoid dollar-based 
purchases; in practice this was not always be possible.xix An example of this was the cotton 
trade.  China was principal source of Hong Kong’s pre-war supply and although China was in 
the late 1940s increasingly short of raw cotton and foreign exchange as the KMT regime 
collapsed, China was anxious to maintain the Hong Kong market.xx Part of the incentive for 
China to maintain the Hong Kong market was the prospect of earning sterling; part was to 
keep cheaper Japanese yarn out.xxi For these reasons China expressed a willingness to sell to 
Hong Kong through official channels at a price below that available elsewhere. Although the 
KMT regime subsequently collapsed, the policy of maintaining the Hong Kong market 
through competitive prices remained, even under communism. 
3.2 Maximizing Development, Minimizing Risk
The PRC’s determination to maintain Hong Kong as a source of foreign exchange was not 
solely based on price competitiveness. It was also based on the need to maximize its 
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development prospects via the accumulation of foreign exchange while at the same time 
minimizing the external risk to the PRC. It achieved these often conflicting objectives by 
applying hard economic principles to decisions on monetary policy, and by relying on staff 
who had demonstrated their loyalty to communist values and who had an expert knowledge 
of international foreign exchange markets. Although in practice this meant that the PRC’s 
Hong Kong banks had the trade and liquidity preference outlined by Bloomfield (1957), it 
also meant that the problems of dynamic commitment and time inconsistency in policy did 
not arise.
The ability to apply hard economic principles was illustrated following the the devaluation of 
the pound sterling and the Hong Kong dollar in November 1967. Media reports suggested 
that there was a widespread belief that if sterling were devalued, the PRC would ultimately 
follow suit.xxii These beliefs were based on the assumption that there existed a strong political 
rationale for China to absorb the cost of such devaluation. The cost was a loss of foreign 
exchange earnings. But not raising prices would win a political advantage and help repair 
some of the reputational damage following the communist riots earlier in that year. This did 
not happen. The Bank of China revalued the RMB against the Hong Kong dollar and 
compensated itself fully for the loss in earnings brought about by sterling’s devaluation. The 
action was entirely rational in the sense that it effectively defended the real value of its 
exports to Hong Kong, but in doing so it also passed on inflationary pressures. Not only did it 
do this, but Chinese stores in Hong Kong also raised prices by about 15 percent.xxiii It is clear 
that PRC officials believed that Hong Kong could afford higher prices. They may have been 
aware that the PRC exports were comparatively inelastic due to domestic production 
constraints and would not have been able to compensate for any loss through increases in 
quantity.
The revaluation of the RMB in 1967 illustrated the priority that the PRC attached to 
maintaining foreign currency earnings. China’s trade surplus with Hong Kong allowed it to 
run deficits with other countries. Jao (1983) shows that had China not run a surplus with 
Hong Kong, China would have run substantial trade deficits in at least 24 years of the period 
1950-1980. The approach could be explained by the fact that the predominant part of China’s 
imports during this period consisted of plant and machinery, grains, raw materials and 
fertilisers, all of which were supplied directly to China from countries such as Japan. During 
the period 1961-73 Hong Kong benefited greatly from PRC imports citing research which 
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showed that Hong Kong’s cost of living would have been at least 15% higher for the same 
level of consumption (Jao, 1983:23). In this context the revaluation and subsequent price 
increase appears to be based on a careful consideration of the economic consequences. It also 
illustrated the astuteness of the PRC’s monetary policy. This was again illustrated in the 
ability to predict the stability of sterling in 1971 and the weakness of the US dollar in 1971-
72 and its subsequent revaluation.xxiv
The PRC could not however have effectively balanced the risks and rewards in such a way 
without highly competent banking officials who were willing to work with their foreign 
banking counterparts without compromising on their ideological beliefs. For example, during 
1967 the demand from the Bank of China for sterling was such that HSBC had to buy US 
Dollars, to convert to sterling and negotiate an emergency government issue. There was an 
increase of HK$600 million (£37.5 million) in local note issue between May and July 1967 to 
meet this demand (Schenk, 2009: 113). Neither could the PRCs monetary assessments be so 
accurate without staff that had intimate knowledge of overseas banking practices as well as 
domestic economic and political developments. One such banker was Zheng Tieru (known in 
Hong Kong as Shou Chen). Zheng studied economics in the US before joining the Bank of 
China in Guangdong Province in 1922. Zheng was regarded as an expert in international 
banking and a personal friend of Zhou Enlai.xxv He managed the Hong Kong branch for 
almost 30 years until 1966. His achievements included overseeing the Hong Kong operations 
of the Bank of China prior to 1949, and ensuring their safe transition to state-ownership under 
the CCP in 1949.xxvi His leadership was illustrated both by the respect he enjoyed among 
leading private sector entrepreneurs in Hong Kong and his close connections to the political 
system in Beijing. Zheng’s successor, Li Choh-chi enjoyed a similar background. xxvii Li 
guided the Bank through the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and the sterling crisis of 1967. 
The ability of the Bank to maintain and honour all deposits was testament to the 
management’s ability to manage conflict despite political hostilities. 
3.3 The RMB as a Stable Alternative 
The scale of investment needed to modernise industry meant that by the beginning of the 
1970s the aversion to international loan finance that had characterised the early development 
of the PRC became less feasible.  Beginning in 1968 the PRC began to actively promote the 
RMB as currency for price quotation and trade settlement.xxviii Such efforts increase in 
response to growing uncertainly in the global monetary environment following the ending of 
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the Breton Woods Gold Standard in 1971 as well as changes in the international banking 
environment. Greater internationalisation of the RMB would have provided a degree of 
stability in what was a very uncertain monetary environment. In achieving this, the PRC once 
again befitted from both an assertive banking system and an astute monetary policy. Chinese 
state-owned banks actively engaged in efforts to repair their relationships with the 
international business community. During this period the PRC followed a foreign exchange 
policy based on combination of stable domestic prices and an overvalued Yuan, the result of 
which led to financial losses for many exported commodities when measured in domestic 
currency (Lardy, 1992). But this policy meant that it was easier to market the RMB as a 
stable currency that was likely to appreciate in value.
In promoting the RMB as a stable alternative to other international currencies, PRC banks in 
Hong Kong expanded their branch networks and offered attractive interest rates. Between 
1969 and 1978 the Bank of China and its sister banks (also under state ownership) increased 
their branch numbers from 57 to 123.xxix Such increases were only possibly by exploiting a 
loophole in Hong Kong’s banking regulations, which restricted the increase of foreign 
banking entities in the colony. The Bank also went against the local trend of interest rate 
reductions. xxx  In October 1974 the Bank of China in Hong Kong raised its six month deposit 
rate to 7 per cent, an increase of 2.5% on the previous rate. The interest rate on one year 
deposits was raised to 8 per cent up from 5.75 per cent and the interest rate on three year 
deposits was increased to 8.5 per cent from 6.75% per cent. By offering a higher interest rate 
the Bank hoped to attract back depositors following the outflow and loss of confidence that 
occurred during the early years of the Cultural Revolution. Such deposits were in non-
convertible currency whose export was strictly forbidden by PRC law. However, there was a 
book entry at the Mainland bank which entitled the depositor to receive a sum in Hong Kong 
dollars (not RMB) to be calculated at the expiry of the deposit’s tenor at the prevailing rate of 
exchange between the RMB and the Hong Kong dollar. It is also interesting how the 
activities of the Hong Kong banks coincided with efforts in 1974 to normalise economic life 
on the Mainland. These efforts included export promotion and import substitution, the 
increase use of foreign trade loans and the sales of Chinese gold reserves (Reardon, 2002: 
174-75).  Figure 2 shows the changes in the banking model of Hong Kong branch Bank of 
China over the period 1964 to 1980. During this period it not only rapidly expanded its 
deposit base, but it also began to engage in lending thus moving away from its original focus 
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on trade finance. Figure 2 also shows how this coincided with an increase in the PRCs 
external trade from 6.7 percent of GDP in 1964 to 12.5 percent in 1980. 
(Figure 2 here)
While attracting non-deliverable deposits offered an ideologically acceptable way of raising 
finance, the internationalisation of RMB raised an important dilemma. This related to the 
PRC’s ideological aversion to capitalist trade. Financing industrialisation or the transfer of 
foreign technology through foreign credits was viewed by officials as running the risk of 
importing capitalist inflation into the cost structure of the socialist economy.xxxi The 
preference for hard currency earnings was a clear indication of how China wanted to pay its 
way in international trade. This intention illustrated in the early 1970s as China sought to 
increase its imports of industrial plant and machinery. In January 1972 China rejected an 
offer of trade credits to purchase a vinylon plant from Japan.xxxii But resolving the dilemma 
was also vital to reduce the uncertainly that faced large state trading companies in trading 
with their largest customer Japan. Up to the 1970s most of the trade with Japan was invoiced 
in sterling. It is no surprise that China’s risk adverse trading corporations and their Japanese 
trading partners would have a preference for moving away from sterling. In 1972 following a 
normalisation of trading relations with the US, the PRC began to use a combination of export 
promotion and short term foreign exchange loans to finance the purchase of foreign plant and 
machinery as part of a large scale import substitution development strategy (Reardon, 2002: 
157-162). A substantial proportion of these loans were funded from the deposits held by the 
Bank of China in Hong Kong, a move that vastly increased China’s ability to import plant, 
but remained consistent with China’s aversion to capitalist trade financing.
The shift was reinforced by Deng Xiaoping, who in reiterating the validity of the Four 
Modernisations, stressed the need to import advanced technology in order to speed up the 
technical transformation of industry.xxxiii Acceptable means of financing this included 
deferred payment.xxxiv  The acceptance of the RMB appeared an important element of this. In 
1974 China agreed to purchase from the Japanese synthetic fibre maker Teijin Ltd a ¥5,000 
million polyester fibre plant.xxxv The plant would be paid for in Yuan over a five-year period. 
On the Japanese side the deferred payment side of the deal was to be financed by a loan from 
the Export-Import Bank of Japan. The key to this deal appears to have been both the 
willingness of Japan to accept the Chinese Yuan as a means of invoicing and China’s 
willingness to enter into a deferred payment agreement. Writing contracts for foreign plant 
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purchases has the effect of removing some of the uncertainty in the international monetary 
environment at the time. This was an uncertainty that PRC officials viewed as a fundamental 
fault in the workings of the capitalist system and one that was used to exploit developing 
economies. In doing so it resolved the pressing dilemma facing Sino-Japanese trade, namely 
how to move away from the reliance on settlement in sterling. It was also an example of the 
willingness of Japan to accept the RMB as a currency of trade settlement. 
The shift to deferred payments was also accompanied by a more general recognition that the 
Chinese economy suffered from being cut off from the outside world. By 1975 trade deals 
were not only based on deferred payments, but also denominated in US currency.xxxvi  By 
1977, Jao (1983: 26) points out that outstanding trade credits amounted to some US$1,315 
billion and Chinese officials now viewed them as a standard commercial practice. This went 
further towards removing the antagonism towards foreign borrowing.xxxvii Innovations such 
as the use of a mutual deposit scheme whereby the Bank of China and other foreign banks 
would deposit funds with each other in their respective national currencies, with the foreign 
banks depositing more, essentially amounted to a de facto inter-bank loan (Jao, 1983). By 
1979 official sources were quoted as acknowledging that the type and scale of projects that 
China needed to fund for further modernisation were simply too large to be solved with 
private level economic cooperation and that national level financing in the form of loans and 
trade credits would in future be necessary.xxxviii The projects cited included iron ore port 
facilities, railways, hydroelectric power stations. It was also recognition that despite the 
advances achieved under self-sufficiency, the gap between Western and Chinese technology, 
even in sectors such as petrochemicals which had benefited from Japanese trade credits, 
could not be bridged without full access to foreign expertise (Kambara and Howe, 2007). In 
practice this meant foreign direct investments rather than capital account convertibility.  The 
direction of future policy was clearly set out in 1980 under the Provisional Regulations for 
Exchange Control, which emphasised the spirit of control and promotion. Control referred to 
centralised rules on the amount of foreign exchange that localities would be allowed to retain 
and limits on its use for private gain; promotion referred to efforts of localities and 
enterprises to earn foreign exchange.xxxix
4. Policy Implications 
The account of the efforts to have the RMB accepted in foreign trade is interesting both for 
why it was successful and why it failed. The efforts were successful to the extent that they 
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allowed China stability and predictability in its international trade relations, particularly with 
Japan. Efforts to raise deposits in Hong Kong and rebuild relationships with the local 
business community following the Cultural Revolution were also successful. PRC banks were 
able to market a stable currency that had very limited downside. Ideologically the policy was 
acceptable as the RMB was non-deliverable and there was little chance of outflow. However 
its shortcoming was that the scale of finance required for China’s modernisation was simply 
too large. Private level cooperation with limited currency risk was simply too small for the 
ports, railways and power stations that the transition from a pre-industrial society required.  It 
also failed because the desire to retain control over the national currency and ultimately a fear 
of foreign exploitation remained intact. The switch to FDI in the 1980s and the adoption of a 
control and promotion strategy meant that the PRC was able to find an alternative way to 
finance its modernisation, but it left unresolved the issue of greater RMB internationalisation. 
The implications of this shortcoming are that the capital account mobility has remained 
tightly controlled and largely restricted to FDI inflows with a minimal role for foreign 
financial institutions. 
One of the significant successes of the pre-reform period was the ability of China’s state-
owned banks in Hong Kong to manage the link between monetary policy and national 
competiveness. In the late 1960s PRC officials demonstrated an astute awareness of what 
effect a revaluation of the RMB would have on Hong Kong’s economy. This awareness was 
ultimately built on a banking system that sought to maximise foreign exchange returns but 
mitigate any risks that operating in capitalist markets entailed.  It is interesting that even 
today; the question remains one of critical economic importance. For example, in the 
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, Chinese officials virtually ignored attempts to pin 
the blame for the crisis on them. Instead their major concern was a return to protectionism in 
their major export markets (Tobin, 2011). Secure market access has been a long term priority 
in achieving socialist modernisation. So too has balancing the need for foreign exchange 
earnings with that of mitigating the effects of undue swings in capital flows. But the 
downside of this is that just as the issue of self-sufficiency and a die-hard opposition to 
allowing foreign investment in oil and gas resources that required any kind of foreign 
ownership or access to land long remained a stumbling block to progress in those sectors 
(Kambara and Howe, 1997); so too does the issue of allowing the free export of RMB.
There is also a remarkable similarity between the international economic environment faced 
by the PRC in the early 1970s and its effect on foreign exchange earnings, but a notable 
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difference in the competitive challenge faced. The international economic crisis in the 1970s 
undoubtedly dampened demand for the PRCs exports, though Reardon (2002: 174) points out 
that the State Planning Commissions own assessment placed the blame on the economic 
disruption caused by the 1974 Anti Lin/Anti Confucius campaign. These included the 
shortage in export commodities and higher vessel rental fees caused by port disruptions. ?
However despite these setbacks, the economy emerged from the Cultural Revolution in 
surprisingly good condition. Wages were 7.2 percent lower in 1976 than they had been in 
1965. Retail prices had fallen by 1.7 percent, and the gross value of industrial output rose by 
an annual 15.7 per cent in real terms.  The gross value of agricultural production increased by 
4.6 percent in real terms, while foreign trade expanded by 19.7 percent a year in US dollar 
terms.xl However unlike the 1970s, the onset of the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis has 
witnessed a slowing in the growth of China’s current account surplus, while domestic policy 
measures have simultaneously sought to manage FDI inflows and encourage greater outward 
FDI (Table 2). In the run up to the crisis, China’s economy also appeared to be suffering from 
rising costs and slowing productivity. From 2004-2008, average manufacturing wages grew 
by 14.1 per cent while labour productivity grew by 10.7 per cent.xli Taken together, these 
developments indicate that although the global contexts for internationalisation were 
somewhat similar, the domestic policy challenges driving internationalisation are very 
different.
From this perspective, the off-shore deposit market in Hong Kong appears to offer the type of 
unconventional arrangement that can act as a buffer for the domestic banking system while at 
the same time facilitating a greater RMB internationalisation. However like its counterpart in 
the 1970s, it does not necessarily offer a new way forward. In the 1970s the solutions 
involved trade credits, non-deliverable deposit accounts, mutual deposit schemes, 
international loans and ultimately FDI inflows. However they stopped short of allowing free 
movement of capital. Any further liberalisation will imply that capital can as easily move 
outwards as inwards. It is this point that clearly differentiates the current challenge from that 
faced in the 1970s. In its relatively short period as a significant creditor nation, China has 
accumulated a net international asset position that is converging with Japan and a net long 
foreign currency position of almost 60% GDP (Cheung et al, 2010: 2). The latter has arisen 
mainly as a result of the non use of RMB by non-residents. This issue has been less of a 
problem for Japan as its currency is also used by non-residents. For China this risk has been 
amplified by a cycle of monetary tightening, expectations that greater inflows of US$ and 
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interest rate rises will lead to a RMB appreciation and a subsequent greater incentive for 
foreign enterprises to hold RMB. These risks were illustrated in 2011, when China reported 
an unprecedented net outflow of US$3.1 billion.xlii
A final but vital consideration is that of banking reform. Both theory and the evidence 
presented in this paper suggest that a fully functioning banking system is the unavoidable 
component of greater capital account convertibility. It is inextricably linked to the target of 
turning Shanghai into a global RMB settlement centre. Greater capital account convertibility 
is itself a precondition for the greater participation of foreign banks. In this regard, it is 
somewhat remarkable that both official and independent scholarly accounts give relatively 
scant attention to the role of banks in China’s economic take-off (Goodstadt, 2012). Scholars 
have pointed out how in the period 1979-1983 the Bank of China actively began to engage in 
international borrowing to finance PRC infrastructure projects (Kueh and Howe, 1984: 823); 
but by and large the focus of authoritative accounts has been how economic reform went 
hand in hand with a decentralization of control over international trade and its proceeds from 
central to local government (Solinger, 1993). By the end of the 1990s however it was clear 
that banks were one of the least reformed sectors of the economy. In the past stable financial 
institutions played a crucial role not just in mobilising finance, but also in mitigating the 
structural risks that developing economies typically face in international trade. While it 
remains possible for the PRC to maintain control over the money market in Hong Kong 
through quotas and interest rates, it is unclear how this control would translate were China to 
experience a significant outflow of funds.
(Table 2 here) 
5. Conclusion 
The analysis presented in this paper illustrates the long term value placed on the Hong Kong 
market by the PRC. Access to Hong Kong’s developed financial institutions has allowed the 
PRC to maximise receipts from foreign trade as well as minimise the risks of undue swings in 
capital flows. This access has allowed the PRC mitigate some of the longstanding structural 
constraints that typically face developing economies. The role of the PRC’s banks in helping 
to mitigate this constraint is particularly interesting given the well-known problems that the 
sector now faces. The analysis also presents some policy implications for contemporary 
approaches to RMB internationalisation. The concern over finding an acceptable method of 
RMB liberalisation remains paramount, as does the dilemma of how to achieve greater 
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internationalisation without damaging export competitiveness. The analysis in this paper has 
shown how in the past the banking system, particularly the international side, adopted a 
strong interest in ensuring the competitiveness of Chinese exports. Its role appeared crucial in 
managing the exchange rate mechanism in China’s national interest. The growth of RMB 
deposits in Hong Kong indicates that China continues to see a strong role its state banks in 
the greater international use of the RMB, but it is unclear how in the absence of domestic 
financial reform this can translate into improved economic performance.  This analysis 
suggests that the important difference between the pre- and post-reform regime is that under 
the former the CCP used moral authority and affinity to communist values to mitigate moral 
hazard and risk of outflow within the foreign exchange system; under the latter it must rely 
on market disciplines. As such the ability to control such outflows cannot be assumed in the 
absence of fully developed financial institutions. In the absence of the latter, it is likely that 
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2004 4 12,127 38 5,417 6,710
2005 4 22,585 38 10,619 11,966
2006 4 22,722 38 12,228 11,175
2007 4 33,400 37 22,539 10,861
2008 4 56,061 39 38,119 17,942
2009 4 62,718 60 40,662 22,056 1,757 2.8
2010 4 314,938 111 117,573 197,365 263,238 83.6
2011 4 588,529 133 176,398 412,132 585,488 99.5
2012 1 554,317 135 156,788 397,528 571,176 103.0
2012 2 557,710 133 136,616 421,094 641,907 115.1
Source: Financial Secretary’s Office (Hong Kong), Economic Report (Chapter 4).
Table 2: Current and Capital Account Flows as a % of GDP (2005-2001) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2011
Q3 
Current account 7.13 9.21 10.64 9.43 5.95 5.15 2.82
Capital & Financial 
Account 2.79 0.37 2.10 0.42 2.90 3.81 4.99
FDI 3.51 2.88 3.96 3.27 1.57 3.12 3.11
OFDI -0.50 -0.66 -0.48 -1.18 -0.88 -1.02 -0.69
Securities -0.22 -2.49 0.53 0.94 0.78 0.40 0.37
Other Investments -0.18 0.49 -1.99 -2.68 1.36 1.22 2.12
Currency & Deposits 0.14 0.03 0.92 -0.68 0.33 0.04 0.65
Errors and Omissions -0.74 -0.47 0.47 -0.58 -0.87 -1.01 -0.32
Source: State Statistical Bureau (2005-2010) and State Administration for Foreign Exchange (2011, Q3)
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Figure 1: Hong Kong Renminbi Deposits: Time vs. Demand
?
Source: Hong Kong Financial Secretary Economic Report. Interest rates are based on a Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority survey of banks 
Figure 2: Ratio Advances to Deposits (Bank of China (Hong Kong)) and PRC Trade to 
GDP (%) 1964-1980 
Source: Trade data and National Income data is from National Bureau of Statistics of China. Banking data for 
1964-68 were derived from the statistical returns from licensed banks collected monthly by the Banking 
Commission and preserved in the following Hong Kong Public Records Office files: HKRS163-1-3273 
‘Banking Statistics Various 1965’. HKRS163-1-3274 ‘Banking Statistics Various – 1966’, HKRS163-1-3275 
‘Banking Statistics Various – 1967’, HKRS163-1-3276 ‘Banking Statistics Various’. Data for 1979-1980 is 
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